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I. Introduction
In their foundational paper, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, further 
described in Chapter 1 of this volume, Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg (2010a) 
develop a theoretical framework for analyzing and systematizing knowledge commons, 
thereby tilting the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework approach, 
originally developed by Ostrom and her colleagues for natural resource commons 
(Ostrom 1990), in a new direction. Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg offer the 
modified IAD framework to provide further systematic analysis of knowledge commons 
systems and hope that other scholars will consider using the framework as part of their 
own work. That is exactly what Jorge Contreras has done in Chapter 4 of this volume, 
where he applies the modified IAD framework in order to get a better grip on the sys-
temic elements of the genome commons. Contreras sketches the evolution of genomics 
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data release policies, applying the framework described in Chapter 1 to examine the char-
acteristics and components of the genome commons structure.
Rather than attempt a full analysis of the Contreras chapter, this chapter elaborates on 
one important issue. Looking at the genome commons through the lens of the modified 
IAD framework, this chapter zooms in on the constitutive characteristics of the genome 
commons, in particular on the elements revolving around provisioning and consumption 
of the commons. Studying the modified IAD framework and the genome commons in 
depth reveals that property plays a vital role in both the provisioning and the consump-
tion of the commons. The property/nonproperty dichotomy plays a key role in the legal 
regimes and entitlements provisioning the commons, as well as in the legal institutions 
governing access to and use of resources to create a knowledge commons.
Interrogating the specific example of the genome commons through the modified 
IAD framework and through contemporary insights in the commons literature leads to 
the conclusion that the current genome commons is managed as a “common property” 
or, more specifically, as a limited research commons. This chapter argues that it would 
be desirable to manage genomic resources more often under an “open commons” model 
with symmetric access and use rules.
The present chapter starts, in Section II, with a look at the concepts of resources and 
actors, which are important to understanding provisioning and consumption:  what 
resources constitute the genome commons and who is involved? This examination is 
rather brief, as it is meant to be a prelude to the main theme, explored in Sections III and 
IV, namely the governance or rules in use: how are the resources provisioned and how 
can the resources be used? When discussing governance, this chapter also will look into 
closely related issues, such as background environment, openness regime, and entitle-
ment regime. The chapter then analyzes delicate qualification and normative issues in 
Section V: Can the genome commons be characterized as a (knowledge) commons and 
is that a desirable approach? The chapter finishes off with some suggestions for further 
research in Section VI and concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. Resources and Actors
As discussed in Chapter 1, a knowledge commons may hold a variety of types of resources. 
According to Contreras, the resources held in the genome commons are genomic data. 
No definition of “genomic data” is provided, but one can infer from Contreras’s descrip-
tions in Chapter 4 that “genomic data” may refer to raw DNA sequence data (encom-
passing genomic sequences of individual humans, micro-organisms residing within 
the human body, and other organisms), to physiological data (e.g., data relating to the 
association between particular genetic markers and disease risk), and to phenotypic data 
(including elements such as de-identified subject age, ethnicity, weight, demograph-
ics, exposure, disease state, and behavioral factors). This vast amount of genomic data is 
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predominantly stored in publicly managed electronic databases around the world, usu-
ally available independently of journal publication. Principal databases for the deposit of 
genomic sequence data are GenBank,1 EMBL,2 and the DDBJ.3
A variety of types of knowledge commons participants also may be identified. Contreras 
points out that the “principal stakeholder communities” relevant to the genome com-
mons include funding agencies (playing a crucial role in drafting and enforcing release 
policies, such as NIH), data generators (specialized scientists playing a vital role in gen-
erating large data sets), data users, data intermediaries (commercial or nonprofit entities 
playing a vital role in the creation and management of databases), data subjects (human 
subjects from whom the genomic information is derived), and the public. Contreras’s 
discussion suggests that all of these actors and stakeholders constitute a community shar-
ing the commons. It would seem more appropriate, however, to distinguish between the 
community per se which actually produces and shares the commons (including the data 
generators, data users, and data intermediaries) and the larger community, or social envi-
ronment, in which the community per se is nested and which facilitates and empowers 
the construction of the commons. This social environment includes funding agencies and 
members of the public, especially as represented by patient advocacy and disease interest 
groups.
III. Provision of Resources—Construction of the Commons (“How”)
Once it is clear what resources can be part of the commons and who is involved, the ques-
tion arises how those resources become part of the commons: the construction or provi-
sion of the commons. This question may be answered by considering the background 
propertized environment, various institutions that deviate from that environment, and 
various entitlement structures.
1 GenBank is the National Institutes of Health (NIH, U.S.) genetic sequence database, encompassing approxi-
mately 126,551,501,141 bases in 135,440,924 sequence records in the traditional GenBank divisions and 
191,401,393,188 bases in 62,715,288 sequence records in the WGS division as of April 2011 (see http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/).
2 The EMBL Nucleotide Sequence Database (also known as EMBL-Bank) constitutes Europe’s primary nucleo-
tide sequence resource. Main sources for DNA and RNA sequences are direct submissions from individual 
researchers, genome sequencing projects, and patent applications. The database is produced in an international 
collaboration with GenBank (U.S.) and the DNA Database of Japan (DDBJ). Each of the three groups col-
lects a portion of the total sequence data reported worldwide, and all new and updated database entries are 
exchanged between the groups on a daily basis. Over the years EMBL-Bank has grown exponentially and cur-
rently contains over 96 million entries corresponding to 170 gigabases of sequence from over 280,000 organ-
isms (see http://www.embl.org/).
3 DDBJ, the DNA Data Bank of Japan, is the sole nucleotide sequence data bank in Asia, which is officially 
certified to collect nucleotide sequences from researchers. Collected data are exchanged with EMBL-Bank 
and with GenBank on a daily basis. The principal purpose of DDBJ operations is to improve the quality of the 
International Nucleotide Sequence Database (INSD) (www.insdc.org).
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A. Background Environment
In the modified IAD framework described in Chapter 1, provisioning is treated first 
in the context of the background environment. Two starting points are envisaged: a 
“natural” cultural environment without intellectual property (IP) and a “default” 
IP-based cultural environment, corresponding respectively to the public domain and 
to a propertized environment. Chapter 1 also suggests that the natural cultural environ-
ment is the appropriate starting point for discussing knowledge commons in which IP 
rights are available but play a marginal role. The natural environment may be the most 
appropriate baseline for viewing a cultural commons even if IP protection is available 
for the resources contributed to the commons, and even if IP law plays some role in its 
construction.
According to Contreras’s analysis in Chapter 4, the genome commons presents a com-
plex picture, as the commons encompasses “biomedical discoveries,” which are in prin-
ciple subject to patent law, as well as large aggregations of data, which may be subject to 
copyright rules or technical protection measures.
I fully concur with Contreras on this point. The background environment of the genome 
commons is indeed a mixed nonproprietary/proprietary environment. Two distinct back-
ground environments apply to genomic data, encompassing DNA sequence data, physi-
ological data, and phenotypic data. First and foremost, it is fair to say that the genomic 
commons emerged as a “natural” cultural environment in which data were not covered by 
IP. From the initiation of the Human Genome Project (HGP),4 the scientific communities 
collecting genomic data traditionally abided by a strong open science norm, under which 
data were provisioned and subsequently shared. Statements from the NIH in 19915 and 
the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) in 19956 bear witness to this open science 
4 Begun formally in 1990, the U.S. Human Genome Project was a thirteen-year effort coordinated by the U.S. 
Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The project originally was planned to last 
fifteen years, but rapid technological advances accelerated the completion date to 2003. Project goals were to 
identify all the approximately 20,000–25,000 genes in human DNA, to determine the sequences of the three 
billion chemical base pairs that make up human DNA, to store this information in databases, to improve tools 
for data analysis, to transfer related technologies to the private sector, and to address the ethical, legal, and social 
issues (ELSI) that may arise from the project. For more details, see http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/
Human_Genome/project/about.shtml.
5 The NIH DOE Guidelines 1991 state that “[a] fter extensive discussion with the community of genome research-
ers, the advisors of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Energy (DOE) genome 
programs have determined that consensus is developing around the concept that a six-month period, from the 
time data or materials are generated to the time they are made available publicly, is a reasonable maximum in 
almost all cases. More rapid sharing is encouraged” (NHGRI 1991).
6 The HUGO Position Statement 1995 states: “Sequence data should immediately and publicly be disseminated 
without restrictions on its use” (HUGO 1995). Contreras does not discuss the HUGO policy documents. It is 
unclear why he does not do so.
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norm. With the signing of the Bermuda Principles in 1996,7 the principle of free availabil-
ity and rapid data release (within twenty-four hours) was firmly embedded.8 The collective 
norm of rapid and unencumbered data sharing became an integral part of the NIH’s9 and 
HUGO’s10 policies soon after. In the years to follow, many genome sequencing initiatives 
also applied the open science norm with regard to the provisioning of the data.11 In 2003, 
the Ft. Lauderdale Principles were introduced. Projects such as the SNP Consortium and 
the international HapMap project,12 which were classified as Community Resource Projects 
(CRPs)—“specifically devised and implemented to create a set of data, reagents or other 
material whose primary utility will be as a resource for the broad scientific community”13—
reaffirmed the Bermuda Principles requirement that generated data be released rapidly.14
At the same time, however, quite a few pieces of data were shielded with IP rights, 
such as patents, following a property logic. Somewhat unfortunately, Contreras does not 
review the data release policy documents systematically from this IP angle, let alone from 
a global perspective, for he focuses mainly on the United States and does not look at 
Europe at all. On the global level, and from the outset of the HGP, HUGO accepted 
7 The 1996 Bermuda Principles state that “[i] t was agreed that all human genomic sequence information gener-
ated by centres funded for large-scale human sequencing, should be freely available and in the public domain 
in order to encourage research and development and to maximise its benefit to society.” The 1997 Bermuda 
Principles set forth that “[t]he principles enunciated at the first International Strategy meeting, of rapid data 
release and public access to the primary genomic sequence, are reaffirmed.”
8 According to Marshall (2001), researchers first pledged to share the results of sequencing “as soon as possible,” 
releasing all stretches of DNA longer than 1000 units, and “second, they pledged to submit these data within 
24 hours to the public database known as GenBank.”
9 The National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) Policy 1997 sets forth that “[i] n conformity 
with the existing spirit and philosophy of the Human Genome Project (HGP) and in response to the recom-
mendations of advisors and the expressed wishes of the community, NHGRI seeks to make DNA sequence 
information available as rapidly and freely as possible”; “[i]t is therefore NHGRI s intent that human genomic 
DNA sequence data, generated by the projects funded under RFA HG-95-005, should be released as rapidly 
as possible and placed in the public domain where it will be freely available.”
10 The HUGO Statement 1997 “[u] rges all large-scale sequencing centres and their funding agencies to adopt the 
policy of immediate release, without privileged access for any party, of all human genome sequence informa-
tion” and “[s]tresses that only the policy of rapid publication and free availability of human genome sequence 
information will secure further international co-operation of large-scale sequencing centres” (HUGO 1997).
11 As Contreras explains in Chapter 4, commercial companies, such as Celera, ultimately also applied the same 
approach and released their data.
12 “The [HapMap] project is committed to rapid and complete data release, and to ensuring that project data 
remain freely available in the public domain at no cost to users. The project follows the data-release principles 
of a ‘community resource project’ ” (see hapmap.org).
13 Wellcome Trust (2003). As Contreras explains in Chapter 4, CRPs are distinguished from “hypothesis-driven” 
research, in which the goal is to answer a particular scientific question.
14 The Wellcome Trust Ft. Lauderdale Principles of 2003 stipulate that “[t] he meeting attendees enthusiasti-
cally reaffirmed the 1996 Bermuda Principles, which expressly called for rapid release to the public interna-
tional DNA sequence databases (GenBank, EMBL, and DDBJ) of sequence assemblies of 2kb or greater by 
large-scale sequencing efforts and recommended that that agreement be extended to apply to all sequence 
data, including both the raw traces submitted to the Trace Repositories at NCBI and Ensembl and whole 
genome shotgun assemblies,” and further set forth that “[r]esource producers . . . make the data generated by 
the resource immediately and freely available without restriction” (Wellcome Trust 2003).
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the possibility that researchers might acquire patent protection on DNA sequences for 
which a function had been demonstrated.15 The Bermuda Principles from 1996 also rec-
ognized the right to opt for patent protection as long as utility had been demonstrated. 
Moreover, the Bermuda Principles applied only to CRPs.16
As discussed in Chapter 4, starting with the Ft. Lauderdale Principles, a second gener-
ation of data release requirements emerged, which were increasingly complex and sophis-
ticated.17 Patent protection, though discouraged, was permitted in non-CRPs—such as 
the ENCODE Pilot Project—if a function had been identified. In the United States, the 
NIH also allowed—directly or indirectly—the patenting of DNA and the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) accommodated DNA patents as well.18 In Europe, the 
patentability of human genes demonstrating a function was formally recognized by the 
European Parliament in 1998 in the EU Biotechnology Directive,19 an approach which 
15 The HUGO Statement of 1992 explains that “[p] atenting DNA segments of unknown function are considered 
unjustified.” However, the HUGO Statement of 1992 sets forth that DNA sequences having a function should 
be considered patentable: “Patents should be restricted to genes or other DNA elements of which the function 
is elucidated.” The same line of policy is set forth in the HUGO Statement of 1995 (“Future patent rules, rather 
than rewarding routine discoveries should provide protection for the much more intellectually challenging work 
of determining biological function and application of gene sequences”) and of 1997 (“Reaffirms its Statements on 
Patenting DNA Sequences of 1992 and 1995, clarifying that HUGO does not oppose patenting of useful benefits 
derived from genetic information, but does explicitly oppose the patenting of short sequences from randomly 
isolated portions of genes encoding proteins of uncertain functions”; HUGO “[e]xpresses the hope that the free 
availability of raw sequence data, although forming part of the relevant state of the art, will not unduly prevent 
the protection of genes as new drug targets”). The HUGO Statement of 2000 applies the same approach.
16 The Wellcome Trust Lauderdale Principles of 2003 set forth that “[b] eyond community resource projects, 
many valuable data sets could come from other sources. Still different issues arise in the case of resources that 
emerge from research efforts whose primary goal is not resource generation. In such cases, contribution of the 
data to the public domain as a resource is more a voluntary matter” (Wellcome Trust 2003). See also the discus-
sion in Contreras, this volume, ch. 4.
17 See, e.g., the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) Guidelines of 2003.
18 The NHGRI-DOE Guidelines 1991 state that “in order to assure that novel ideas and inventions are rap-
idly developed for the benefit of the public, intellectual property protection may be needed for same of the 
data and materials.” The NHGRI Policy 1997 says that raw DNA should not be considered patentable: “In 
NHGRI s opinion, raw human genomic DNA sequence, in the absence of additional demonstrated biological 
information, lacks demonstrated specific utility and therefore is an inappropriate material for patent filing”; 
even though the NIH recognizes that patents demonstrating function may have undesired side effects, patent 
protection is not ruled out: “NIH is concerned that patent applications on large blocks of primary human 
genomic DNA sequence could have a chilling effect on the development of future inventions of useful prod-
ucts. Companies are not likely to pursue projects where they believe it is unlikely that effective patent protec-
tion will be available. Patents on large blocks of primary sequence will make it difficult to protect the fruit 
of subsequent inventions resulting from real creative effort. However, according to the Bayh-Dole Act, the 
grantees have the right to elect to retain title to subject inventions and are free to choose to apply for patents 
should additional biological experiments reveal convincing evidence for utility” (NHGRI 1997).
19 Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions (Official Journal L 213, 30/07/1998 p. 0013). The EU Biotechnology Directive 
stipulates that “[a] n element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical 
process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if 
the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element” (Article 5 (2), provided that industrial 
application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene is disclosed (Article 5 (3)).
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was implemented in the European Patent Convention (EPC).20 Over the past decades, a 
large fraction of DNA sequences that have been generated have been protected with pat-
ents, as quantitative and qualitative studies have documented (see, e.g., Jensen & Murray 
2005: 239–40; Huys et al. 2009: 903–09), putting more and more pressure on the “natu-
ral” cultural environment and increasingly turning the “natural” environment into an 
IP-based cultural environment.
B. Deviating Institutions (Creative Environments)
At first sight, it would appear that the wide array of DNA sequences shielded with IP, 
in particular patents, would not be part of the genomic commons (see Figure 4B.1). 
Chapter 1 point outs, however, that identifying the background environment is only the 
beginning of the analysis. Institutions may have been established to govern deviations 
from that background structure. A knowledge commons analysis recognizes that creative 
environments often are shaped by deviating from both the purely natural and the purely 
propertized regimes.
This claim begs the question what institutions have been developed in the genome 
commons to govern deviations from the propertized regimes, and, in particular, what 
creative measures have been designed in the genome commons to govern deviations from 
the patent regime. Contreras does not address this question in his chapter, but such insti-
tutions do exist, and they play a vital role in the construction of a genome commons. One 
such measure, established by intervention from public authorities (legislatures or judicia-
ries), is the research exemption. Research exemptions, where available, allow the use, and 
by inference also the release, of patented DNA sequences for research purposes. Research 
exemptions differ in scope between jurisdictions, but genomic sequences burdened with 
patents tumble into the genome commons in those countries in which research exemp-
tions are established (van Zimmeren & Van Overwalle 2014). (See Figure 4B.1.)
A second measure, applied by private or public/private data generators is so-called 
defensive patenting. Data generators may apply for patent rights with the sole purpose 
of avoiding the possibility that others might acquire rights in the sequences they have 
generated.21 In a defensive patenting strategy, the patent application is withdrawn before 
it is examined. Data generators who employ this strategy waive patent protection them-
selves, while preventing others from obtaining patents, since the knowledge embedded 
in patent applications becomes part of the prior art. This approach enables the resources 
to fall within the nonproperty regime (Figure 4B.1). A third measure, which also may 
be employed by data generators, is licensing. Through nonexclusive licensing, resources 
shift from a pure property environment toward a “take now, pay later” or so-called 
liability regime (Calabresi & Melamed 1972:  1089–92; Reichman 2000:  1743–98). 
20 See Rule 29 Implementing Regulations of the European Patent Convention (EPC).
21 Cf. Contreras, this volume, ch. 4.
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Closely related is yet a fourth measure. Looking at the genome commons through the 
lens of collaborative institutions theory teaches us that patent pools and clearinghouses 
may also be helpful in transforming the property regime into a liability regime (Van 
Overwalle et  al. 2006, 2009, 2010). Patent pools and clearinghouses also change the 
right to exclude into a “take now, pay later” rule, allowing everyone to use the patented 
inventions (with or without payment, depending on the context) and ultimately result-
ing in a commons.22
Looking at the mixed nonproperty/property environmental background in genetics, 
and taking into account the legal instruments that are available to deviate from the prop-
erty regime (such as research exemptions, defensive patenting, nonexclusive collaborative 
licensing), it becomes clear that the genetic commons is provisioned by both nonpatented 
and patented sequences, namely those patented sequences which have been “opened up” 
through creative public and private ordering mechanisms. It is interesting to see that both 
public actors (the legislator, the judiciary) and private actors (data generators) have legal 
22 It has to be admitted that patent pools are less open in terms of membership, and that they manage shared 
resources in a fashion that is much less focused on sustaining joint production than, say, Wikipedia. Wikipedia 
is quite open in terms of membership, contributions, and participation in various aspects of the project largely 
because it focuses on sustaining joint production (see Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2010a: 684).
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tools at their disposition (formal legal norms such as the research exemption or term 
expiration, or legal norms of contract including nonexclusive bilateral licensing or patent 
pools and clearinghouses) to deviate from the pure property regime or (further) impinge 
on the mixed nonproperty/property regime and apply the legal regimes at their disposi-
tion to assist in constructing a genome commons.
C. Entitlement Structures
In the modified IAD framework, the provisioning of the genetic commons is also touched 
upon when exploring the characteristics of the cultural commons that relate to its gover-
nance. The analysis of entitlement structures is “intend[ed] to capture how the resources 
are made part of the commons, and to understand the mechanisms by which resources 
are provisioned to the commons, whether via legal entitlements or otherwise” (my ital-
ics) (Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2010a:  700). It thus seems to me that pat-
ented DNA sequences may form part of the commons. The legal institutions described 
above to deviate from the property regime seem to be the type of entitlement structures 
Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg had in mind.
IV. Consumption of the Resources—Access and Use
Once it is clear what resources can be part of the commons, who is involved, and how 
those resources may become part of the commons, the question of how resources can be 
accessed and used comes to the fore: the question of consumption.
A. Access
Turning to the question of access to the resources, two layers can be distinguished in the 
complex setting of the genome commons. Indeed, in the context of genetic resources, 
access is a two-faceted concept. First, there is access to the informational content of 
genetic sequences. Second, there is access to the tangible component of genetic sequences. 
In his chapter, Contreras pays considerable attention to the first aspect, namely the access 
to the informational content. Over the years, as he describes, increasingly sophisticated 
database technologies have enabled the provision of differentiated levels of access to the 
information content, with both open and controlled access portions.23 In principle, pat-
ents do not hinder access to information; on the contrary, patent law guarantees access 
to the information embedded in the patent description, through the disclosure require-
ment. So, the property/nonproperty discussion—at least with regard to patenting—is 
23 This is the approach applied in the Genetic Association Information Network (GAIN) and in the NIH 
Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) Policy of 2007 (GAIN 2010; NIH 2007).
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not relevant here. Access to informational content is not much of an issue when patent 
is the dominant IP regime. The property/nonproperty debate, and the subsequent access 
issue, are, however, important where copyright comes into play.
Contreras pays little attention to the second aspect—the tangible content of a resource—
and hardly addresses material transfer agreements and the limiting effect such agreements 
may have on access to genetic resources. Studies have revealed that material transfer agree-
ments may have a blocking effect on research.24 Especially when research becomes more 
high level (involving not just raw material but more complex information) it might be nec-
essary for researchers to have access to the tangible resource itself, rather than to the data. 
It has been demonstrated that this is the case for stem cell research, but it might be worth-
while to revisit this issue for genomic material. It remains to be seen, however, how impor-
tant access to tangible resources is in the framework of the commons discourse.
B. Use
More important than the issue of access is the question of to what extent data users really 
can work with the informational content to which they have access. Rather than hinder-
ing access to the information embedded in patented subject matter,25 patents potentially 
block the unencumbered use of such data.
In the modified IAD framework described in Chapter 1, access and use are discussed in 
the context of the third constitutive characteristic, namely openness. Commons regimes 
are defined by the degree of openness and control that they exhibit with respect to con-
tributors, users, and resources.26 With respect to resources, openness is described as the 
capacity to relate to a resource by (accessing and) using it, including the extent to which 
there are barriers to possession or use. The framework does not disentangle the various 
dimensions of use or the purposes for which use might be envisaged:  for mere philo-
sophical inquiry? for further (commercial/non-commercial) use? for improvement? for 
exploitation? With respect to actors, openness refers to the capacity to relate to the com-
munity as a contributor or user of resources. The modified IAD framework includes an 
analysis of the extent to which there are criteria for or barriers to membership or partici-
pation in the creative/innovative processes that the knowledge commons intends to sup-
port. For example, use of the shared resources may be open to anyone, even if the ability 
to contribute to the shared resources is limited.
The modified IAD framework described in Chapter 1 also touches upon (access and) 
use in its inquiry into the governance of a knowledge commons. An important cluster of 
24 Walsh, Cohen, & Cho (2007) point out that practical excludability is rarely associated with the existence of a 
patent in academic settings, but is more readily achieved through secrecy or not sharing research materials.
25 On the contrary, patent law facilitates access to information embedded in technology by way of the disclosure 
requirement.
26 See Frischmann, Madison, & Strandburg, this volume, ch. 1.
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questions in this regard relates to entitlement structures. The inquiry into entitlement 
structures is intended not only to capture how resources are made part of the commons 
and to understand the mechanisms by which resources are provisioned to the commons 
(whether via legal entitlements or otherwise) but also to inquire as to entitlements to use 
and consume those resources once they are part of that commons.
Contreras’s chapter provides an interesting historic account of access and use rules in 
the genome commons and meticulously analyzes the freedom to use (often called “free-
dom to operate”) in each and every project. But what has been the degree of freedom 
to operate over time?27 In light of the various projects and policy documents discussed 
here and in Chapter 4, three levels of freedom to operate can be discerned in my view. 
A first level is freedom to use data for research (see Figure 4B.1). Most, if not all, policies 
allow use of the released data for research purposes. A second level is freedom to publish 
(see Figure 4B.1). A wide series of clauses relates to the use of data for publishing or pre-
sentation purposes. Some restrict use at this level. The Genetic Association Information 
Network (GAIN), established in 2006, was the first genomic data release policy to intro-
duce temporal restrictions on the use of released data for publishing or presenting. Data 
users are prohibited to publish and make presentations based on GAIN data for a specific 
embargo period.28 In 2007, the NIH adopted similar restrictions for the GWA studies29 
and ENCODE project. Such restrictions also were imposed by the international SAE 
Consortium (iSAEC).30 A third level relates to freedom to use data for commercial/mixed 
research–commercial purposes. Many policies forbid or seriously restrict use for such pur-
poses (see Figure 4B.1).
V. A Commons?
Now that I have carefully dissected the elements and characteristics of the genome com-
mons in terms of their provisioning and consumption, two further questions come to 
27 “Freedom to operate” is defined as a situation in which “the commercial production, marketing and use of 
a product, process or service does not infringe the patent rights of others (‘third party patent rights’)” (van 
Zimmeren, Vanneste, & Van Overwalle 2011).
28 “In accord with the NIH GWAS Policy for Data Sharing, and as expressed through the submission of the 
DAR, Approved Users acknowledge the NIH’s expectation that they will not submit GAIN March 1, 2010 
version Page 5 of 11 findings using the GAIN dataset(s), or updated versions thereof, for publication or presen-
tation for a period of exclusivity for Contributing Investigators concluding with the Embargo Date identified 
on the dbGaP or other NIH genomic data repository homepage” (GAIN 2010).
29 NIH (2007).
30 “To qualify for data access researchers must agree to the following restrictions: Not to submit for publication 
or presentation, or make any other use or disclosure of, any Public Data or any abstract, article or other infor-
mation that is based on, includes or uses Public Data for a specified time period not to exceed nine (9) months 
following the Consortium’s initial disclosure of such Public Data (the specific restriction period for such 
Public Data shall be indicated in the database entry for such Public Data)” (International Serious Adverse 
Event Consortium (iSAEC), s.d.).
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the fore. First, can one conclude that the genome commons is indeed a commons, in 
particular a knowledge commons (definitional question)? Next, is a commons structure 
the most appropriate institutional format for the provision and consumption of genomic 
data (normative question)?
A. Definitional Question
Examining the terminological ambiguity with regard to the commons and comparing the 
various terms and qualifications is a daunting task, which goes beyond the scope of the 
present chapter. It will suffice to say that in the commons literature two distinct strands 
have developed and two major regimes of commons have been discerned, as discussed 
in Yochai Benkler’s chapter in this volume.31 On the one hand, there is the “common 
property” regime32 in which “members of a clearly defined group have a bundle of legal 
rights including the right to exclude nonmembers from using that resource” (Hess & 
Ostrom 2003: 121). Most “common property” regimes involve participants who are pro-
prietors and have four rights: access (the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy 
nonsubtractive benefits), extraction (the right to obtain resource units or products of a 
resource system), management (the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform 
the resource by making improvements), and exclusion (the right to determine who will 
have access rights and withdrawal rights, and how those rights may be transferred) (Hess 
& Ostrom 2003:  125–26). On the other hand, there is the so-called “open commons” 
regime, where “no one has the right to exclude anyone from using a resource” (Hess & 
Ostrom 2003: 125–26) and where anyone can access/use the resource and cannot exclude 
others. As Benkler discusses in Chapter 3, the hallmark of “open commons” is “symmetric 
freedom to operate vis-à-vis a resource set, generally or with respect to a class of uses in 
the commons.” The defining institutional feature of an “open commons” is captured by 
its core function: “creating freedom to operate, available to more or less all actors in the 
economy they serve.”
At this point, two observations can be made. First and foremost, both approaches to 
commons study give great weight to the governance dimension of commons (how is the 
commons managed once it has been established?), rather than looking at the provision-
ing dimension of commons (how was the commons established?) to distinguish the two 
types of commons regime. In modified IAD framework terms, this means that more 
attention is given to the consumption component than to the provisioning component 
in defining the type of commons.
31 Benkler, this volume, ch. 3. See also Hess & Ostrom (2003: 121).
32 Some authors speak of a “positive commons” in this regard, referring to “a common in which resources are 
jointly owned and so use of those resources by any one commoner depends on all the commoners having con-
sented” (Drahos 2006).
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Furthermore, two major criteria can be discerned that can be used to discriminate 
between the two types of commons regimes. The first criterion is the scope of use of the 
resource. In a “common property” regime only the members can access/use the resource 
and can exclude nonmembers. In an “open commons” regime more or less anyone may 
use the resource set, and no one, or no group, has exclusive rights against anyone else. 
Moreover, the outputs in an open commons regimes are not subject to exclusive prop-
erty rights, but rather to a regime of full or partial open access. The second criterion 
is the range of users of the resources. In a “common property” regime a clearly defined 
group (Hess & Ostrom 2003), a defined set of claimants (Benkler, this volume, ch. 3), 
or a particular subset of users (Rose 1986) is entitled to access and use. In contrast, in an 
“open commons,” resources are available “for the unorganized public” (Rose 1986) or, as 
Benkler puts it, “to an open or undefined class of users.”
Where do knowledge commons fit in this analysis? Chapter 1 defines knowledge com-
mons as “environments for developing and distributing cultural and scientific knowledge 
through institutions that support pooling and sharing that knowledge in a managed way.” 
Such environments are designed and managed with limitations tailored to the character 
of those resources and to the communities involved rather than left to evolve via market 
transactions grounded solely in the traditional property narrative. This specification does 
not provide a fine-meshed definition, but rather leaves “a big tent,” inviting scholars to 
contribute to assess existing theories (Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2010b).
And how can the genome commons be characterized? Contreras refers to the genome 
commons as the global resource of genetic data which originated with the HGP and the 
sweeping Bermuda Principles and which was made freely available in public databases 
(Contreras 2011). As he explains in Chapter 4, the genome commons is a “massive accu-
mulation of data,” a “vast quantity of genetic information” made available in public data-
bases across the globe, or “a massive accumulation of data.” According to Contreras, the 
genome commons is a “global public resource” which, thanks to its “fundamental shared 
nature,” resembles a “common-pool resource” as studied by Elinor Ostrom and her col-
leagues, rather than the simpler models of the public domain or public good that are typi-
cally set forth in the context of basic scientific research. He takes the view that the genome 
commons evolved from a public domain vehicle into a “polycentric governance institu-
tion for the growth, management and stewardship of a massively-shared public resource.”
Contreras’s observations are not sufficient to classify the genome commons as a “com-
mon property” or an “open commons,” however, since he focuses mainly on data release, 
rather than systematically assessing access and use of the released data. Put differently, 
Contreras pays attention mostly to construction/production/provisioning rules and pol-
icies. And for the most part, he analyses only those governance/consumption/utilization 
restrictions resulting from copyright law, ignoring those resulting from patent law and 
policy. The latter are equally important in the study of the commons, however.
Looking at the utilization dimension of the genome commons in more detail, it seems 
fair to say that the genome commons may have been rather successful in offering equal 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, Fri May 30 2014, NEWGEN
Frischmann180214OUS_Book.indb   149 5/30/2014   3:18:30 PM
150      Governing Knowledge Commons
rights to all users for accessing genetic information and data, thanks to the Bermuda 
Principles and further efforts. However, the genome commons as it stands today does not 
offer equal rights to all to use the genetic data, burdened as the related discoveries may be 
with patents and subsequent restrictions on freedom to use. Following Ostrom, and char-
acterizing a “common property” regime as a regime where access, use (or extraction), man-
agement, and exclusion are available to a well-defined set of users, the genome commons 
appears to be a “common property” regime or, more specifically, a limited commons or 
“genome research commons,” in which access and use of resources is restricted to research-
ers for research purposes. Following Benkler, and characterizing an “open commons” as an 
institution in which all have symmetric freedom to operate with respect to the resource, 
it is highly unlikely that the genome commons as depicted by Contreras can be properly 
characterized as an “open commons.” Some genome commons regimes, however, in which 
access and use of the resources is offered to all (data holders/date generators and data users) 
for a variety of purposes (ranging from research through clinical practice33 to commercial-
ization), are managed as “open commons” or, equivalently, “full genome commons.”
B. Normative Perspective
Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg (2010a) set forth that “[e] xamples of constructed 
cultural commons for which the ‘natural’ environment is the most appropriate baseline 
likely include the commons of scientific research results and tools.” As the genome com-
mons may be regarded as a commons of scientific research results and tools in the basic 
sciences, their view may be interpreted as suggesting that the appropriate background 
environment for the genome commons is the “natural” cultural environment without IP 
and unmediated by rights of exclusion. Benkler suggests that “common property” regimes 
are most appropriate for resources whose scale is large but defined, whereas “open com-
mons” arrangements are more adequate for the management of larger ranges of resources 
open to the entire public or at least to some very large, and largely undefined, set of users 
(Benkler, this volume, ch. 3). As genomic data resources are large and both access and 
use of these resources to develop follow-on innovations greatly benefit society, the ideal 
type of management structure would be the “open commons” model, in which resources 
are managed under symmetric access and use rules and where access and use cannot be 
refused—in other words, permission from a (data) owner is not needed.
However, it has been argued that complete open access to genomic data without any 
publication embargoes might compromise the incentives of upstream researchers. Further 
research is needed to test this argument. Reichman & Uhlir (2003) have argued that, in 
order to preserve the incentives of downstream innovators, follow-on applications of 
genomic databases for commercial purposes should be permitted, subject to requiring the 
33 It is still being debated whether clinical testing can fall under the research exemption. See Van Overwalle et al. 
(2006).
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follow-on innovators to pay a reasonable compensation for such uses. I fully endorse such 
an approach, which would turn the “common property” character of the commons into a 
“for all” approach, by way of a “take now, pay later” or liability regime (Reichman 2000).
VI. Suggestions for Further Research
With respect to the study of the genome commons, I  would like to invite Contreras 
to look further into two issues. The first issue relates to geographical scope. Contreras 
focuses on the situation in the United States, but devotes almost no attention to initia-
tives going beyond the confines of the United States, which include, for example, the 
international policy guidelines from HUGO, European guidelines,34 and the European 
legal framework, with its sui generis database protection, lack of grace period in patent 
law, and so forth. Can one speak of the genetic commons as a “global resource of genetic 
data which was produced in the context of the human genome project” while considering 
only the U.S. context?
The second topic is enforcement. Contreras’s chapter devotes wide attention to the 
history and development of policy guidelines, but pays little attention to how these for-
mal and informal policies are enforced. In particular, one would like to know how com-
pliance with the policies is monitored and how noncompliance is sanctioned. Funding 
often is conditioned on data release: no data release, no funding.35 Use for publication 
often is embargoed. But how is all of this enforced? Are there (empirical) data highlight-
ing current practices in that regard?
On a more detailed (and far less important) level, it would be helpful if Contreras clar-
ified the nature of the resources that are part of his genome commons a little more. Does 
the genome commons include only DNA sequences of which the function is elucidated, 
or does it also include DNA sequences with unknown functions (expressed sequence 
tags (ESTs), short randomly cloned c-DNA segments)? And does the genome commons 
include protein structure data? What about clinical data?
VII. Conclusion
Interrogating the specific example of the genome commons through the modified IAD 
framework and through contemporary insights in the commons literature has led to the 
conclusion that the current genome commons is managed mainly as a “common prop-
erty” or, more specifically, a limited research commons. (See Figure 4B.1). As genomic 
34 Aymé et al. (2008).
35 The GWAS policy states that “[t] he NIH expects that investigators who contribute data to the NIH GWAS 
data repository will retain the exclusive right to publish analyses of the dataset for a defined period of time fol-
lowing the release of a given genotype-phenotype dataset through the NIH GWAS data repository (including 
the precomputed analyses of the data)” (my italics) (NIH 2007).
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data encompasses large classes of resources, which benefit society greatly when they are 
accessed and used to develop follow-on innovations, it would be desirable to have more 
genomic resources run under an “open commons” model, in which resources are man-
aged under symmetric access and use rules, with no permission needed for access and use.
Given the great importance of genomic data for the progress of science and innovation 
and of open availability and unhindered use of genomic resources, further exploration 
of the genome commons and of the various commons narratives is certainly warranted. 
An in-depth (re)examination of U.S.  and European approaches and of the impact of 
European sui generis data protection systems merits further attention if one is to speak of 
a “global” and open genome commons. An analysis and discussion of legal, economic, and 
policy tools to combat pressures to privatize clinical data related to the human genome,36 
which could disrupt the genome commons, would be most welcome as well.
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